The modal logic of set-theoretic potentialism and the potentialist
  maximality principles by Hamkins, Joel David & Linnebo, Øystein
ar
X
iv
:1
70
8.
01
64
4v
3 
 [m
ath
.L
O]
  3
 A
ug
 20
18
THE MODAL LOGIC OF SET-THEORETIC POTENTIALISM
AND THE POTENTIALIST MAXIMALITY PRINCIPLES
JOEL DAVID HAMKINS AND ØYSTEIN LINNEBO
Abstract. We analyze the precise modal commitments of several natural
varieties of set-theoretic potentialism, using tools we develop for a general
model-theoretic account of potentialism, building on those of Hamkins, Leib-
man and Lo¨we [HLL15], including the use of buttons, switches, dials and
ratchets. Among the potentialist conceptions we consider are: rank poten-
tialism (true in all larger Vβ); Grothendieck-Zermelo potentialism (true in all
larger Vκ for inaccessible cardinals κ); transitive-set potentialism (true in all
larger transitive sets); forcing potentialism (true in all forcing extensions);
countable-transitive-model potentialism (true in all larger countable transitive
models of ZFC); countable-model potentialism (true in all larger countable
models of ZFC); and others. In each case, we identify lower bounds for the
modal validities, which are generally either S4.2 or S4.3, and an upper bound
of S5, proving in each case that these bounds are optimal. The validity of S5
in a world is a potentialist maximality principle, an interesting set-theoretic
principle of its own. The results can be viewed as providing an analysis of
the modal commitments of the various set-theoretic multiverse conceptions
corresponding to each potentialist account.
Set-theoretic potentialism is the view in the philosophy of mathematics that the
universe of set theory is never fully completed, but rather unfolds gradually as parts
of it increasingly come into existence or become accessible to us. On this view, the
outer or upper reaches of the set-theoretic universe have merely potential rather
than actual existence, in the sense that one can always form additional sets from
that realm, as many as desired, but the task is never completed. For example, height
potentialism is the view that the universe is never fully completed with respect to
height: new ordinals come into existence as the known part of the universe grows
ever taller. Width potentialism holds that the universe may grow outwards, as with
forcing, so that already-existing sets can potentially gain new subsets in a larger
universe. One commonly held view amongst set theorists is height potentialism
combined with width actualism, whereby the universe grows only upward rather
than outward, and so at any moment the part of the universe currently known
to us is a rank initial segment Vα of the potential yet-to-be-revealed higher parts
of the universe.1 Such a perspective might even be attractive to a Platonistically
inclined large-cardinal set theorist, who wants to hold that there are many large
cardinals, but who also is willing at any moment to upgrade to a taller universe
with even larger large cardinals than had previously been mentioned. Meanwhile,
The authors are grateful to the Set-theoretic Pluralism network for support provided for
their participation at the STP Symposium 2016 in Aberdeen, where this work was initi-
ated. The research of the first author has been supported by grant #69573-00 47 from the
CUNY Research Foundation. Commentary can be made about this article on his blog at
http://jdh.hamkins.org/set-theoretic-potentialism.
1See e.g. [Zer30] (also discussed below), [Put67] and [Hel89], and [Stu13].
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the width-potentialist height-actualist view may be attractive for those who wish
to hold a potentialist account of forcing over the set-theoretic universe V . On the
height-and-width-potentialist view, one views the universe as growing with respect
to both height and width.2 A set-theoretic monist, in contrast, with an ontology
having only a single fully existing universe, will be an actualist with respect to
both width and height. The second author has described various potentialist views
in [Lin13] and [LS17].
Our project here is to analyze and understand more precisely the modal commit-
ments of various set-theoretic potentialist views. We shall restrict ourselves in this
analysis, however, to forms of potentialism based on classical modal logic.3 After
developing a general model-theoretic account of the semantics of potentialism in
section 1 and providing tools in section 2 for establishing both lower and upper
bounds on the modal validities for various kinds of potentialist contexts, we shall
use those tools in section 3 to settle exactly the propositional modal validities for
several natural kinds of set-theoretic height and width potentialism.
The various kinds of set-theoretic potentialism validate in each case a specific cor-
responding modal theory, which expresses the fundamental principles or potentialist
philosophy of that conception. Set-theoretic rank-potentialism and Grothendieck-
Zermelo potentialism, for example, validate precisely S4.3 and exhibit what could
be described as a character of linear inevitability: the central axiom (.3) can be
interpreted as a linearity assertion; the finite pre-linear Kripke frames are complete
for S4.3; and the worlds in these potentialist systems are linearly ordered. Forc-
ing potentialism and countable-transitive model potentialism, in contrast, exhibit
a character of directed convergence, with the validities being exactly S4.2, whose
central axiom expresses the idea that any two possibilities can be brought together
again in a common further possibility, but without any presumption of linearity.
Some systems validate S5, whose central axiom ϕ → ϕ expresses maximality
or completeness, where any statement that could become permanent has already
been made permanent. Meanwhile, the potentialist systems validating only S4, as
in [Ham18; HW17], exhibit a far more radical branching character, one in which
fundamental bifurcations in possibility are revealed as the universe unfolds in one
manner as opposed to another incompatible manner.
Thus, there is a watershed between S4 on the one hand and S4.2 and above on
the other. Only in the latter group of theories does the potentialist translation of
theorem 1 (and the mirroring theorem of [Lin13]) work as it should; this breaks
down when the logic is below S4.2. The first author argues in [Ham18, section 7]
that the convergent forms of potentialism can be seen as implicitly actualist, al-
though the second author counters this with concerns of higher-order logic [LS17,
section 7].
Let us also briefly mention the strong affinities between set-theoretic potentialism
and set-theoretic pluralism, particularly with the various set-theoretic multiverse
conceptions currently in the literature, such as those of the first author [GH10;
Ham11; Ham12; Ham14a]. Potentialists may regard themselves mainly as providing
an account of truth ultimately for a single universe, gradually revealed, the limit of
2See e.g. [Par83] and [Lin13].
3A stricter interpretation of potentialism can be shown to call for intuitionistic logic (with-
out any commitment to the anti-realist assumptions typically used to support this logic) [LS17].
Analogous ideas come up in [Lea77] and [Tai98].
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their potentialist system. Nevertheless, the universe fragments of their potentialist
account can often naturally be taken as universes in their own right, connected
by the potentialist modalities, and in this way, every potentialist system can be
viewed as a multiverse. Indeed, the potentialist systems we analyze in this article—
including rank potentialism, forcing potentialism, generic-multiverse potentialism,
countable-transitive-model potentialism, countable-model potentialism—each align
with corresponding natural multiverse conceptions. Because of this, we take the
results of this article as providing not only an analysis of the modal commitments
of set-theoretic potentialism, but also an analysis of the modal commitments of
various particular set-theoretic multiverse conceptions. Indeed, one might say that
it is possible (ahem), in another world, for this article to have been entitled, “The
modal logic of various set-theoretic multiverse conceptions.”
1. The semantics of potentialism
Although we are motivated by the case of set-theoretic potentialism, the poten-
tialist idea itself is far more general, and can be carried out in a general model-
theoretic context. For example, the potentialist account of arithmetic is deeply
connected with the classical debates surrounding potential as opposed to actual in-
finity, and indeed, perhaps it is in those classical debates where one finds the origin
of potentialism. More generally, one can provide a potentialist account of truth in
the context of essentially any kind of structure in any language or theory.
Allow us therefore to lay out a general model-theoretic account of what we call
the semantics of potentialism. Suppose that W is a collection of structures in a
common signature L—we shall call them worlds—and that W is equipped with an
accessibility relation, making it a Kripke model of L-structures. We say that W is
a potentialist system, if the accessibility relation is reflexive and transitive and if,
furthermore, whenever one world accesses another in W , then the domain of the
first world is contained within that of the second. Thus, a potentialist system is a
reflexive transitive Kripke model of L-structures, in which the accessibility relation
is inflationary in the domains of the structures, so that the individuals of a world
continue to exist in any accessed new world. The main idea of potentialism is that
any particular world W regards the individuals of W as the actually existing indi-
viduals or objects, and those in the larger yet-to-be-accessed worlds have merely a
potential existence; but we may regard those potentially existing objects as actually
existing, if we should simply move to the context and perspective of those larger
worlds.
We shall be principally interested in the case where L is a first-order language
and these are first-order structures, such as in the case of set-theoretic potentialism.
Meanwhile, the ideas do readily generalize to nearly any kind of structure, using
infinitary or higher-order logics, among others.
An important case of potentialism occurs when the accessibility relation of W
is precisely the substructure relation on the family of structures. In particular, for
any class W of L-structures, we may place the potentialist accessibility relation on
W , by which world W accesses U if and only if W is a substructure of U , so the
domain of W is contained within that of U and they agree on the atomic facts
about individuals in W . In this way, any class of L-structures can be viewed as a
potentialist system.
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The semantics of potentialism for any potentialist system is defined, of course,
in the usual Kripkean manner for assertions in the potentialist language L✸, which
augments L with the modal operators and . Namely, we define recursively what
it means to say that an L✸-formula ϕ is true at a world W ∈ W with parameters
a0, . . . , an ∈ W , written:
W |=W ϕ(a0, . . . , an).
Specifically, an atomic assertion ϕ(a0, . . . , an) is true at world W in W for pa-
rameters a0, . . . , an ∈ W just in case the corresponding atomic fact is true in
W in the usual Tarskian sense of L-satisfaction. The truth definition extends
through Boolean combinations in the usual Tarskian manner, so that W |=W
(ϕ ∧ ψ)(a0, . . . , an) just in case both ϕ(a0, . . . , an) and ψ(a0, . . . , an) are true sep-
arately at world W in W ; and ¬ϕ(a0, . . . , an) is true at world W just in case
ϕ(a0, . . . , an) is not true at W . Quantifiers are handled by quantifying only over
the current actual individuals, that is, over the objects of the current possible
world, so that W |=W ∃xϕ(x, a0, . . . , an) just in case there is some a ∈ W for
which W |=W ϕ(a, a0, . . . , an). The modal semantics are determined by the poten-
tialist accessibility relation, so that W |=W ϕ(a0, . . . , an) if and only if W can
access some world U ∈ W for which U |=W ϕ(a0, . . . , an). Similarly, ϕ(a0, . . . , an)
is true at world W just in case ϕ(a0, . . . , an) is true at all such accessed worlds U
in W . Notice that since the domains of the possible worlds are inflationary along
the accessibility relation, there is no need to worry about parameters ceasing to
exist in connection with the clauses just mentioned for the modal operators; thus,
we avoid what can otherwise often be a troublesome matter for modal semantics.
In this way, any collection W of L-structures in the same language determines a
corresponding potentialist semantics in the modal-equipped language L✸ using the
potentialist accessibility relation.
For sufficiently coherent collections of structures W , the potentialist approach
to truth can interact in a meaningful way with the usual Tarskian account of truth
in a kind of limit structure. Namely, we define that a potentialist system W of
L-structures provides a potentialist account of a particular L-structure M , if every
world W in W is a substructure of M and furthermore, for every such W and
every individual a ∈ M , there is a world U ∈ W accessed by W with a ∈ U . In
other words, any world W in W can be extended so as to accommodate any given
individual of M . This can be seen as a weak form of directedness.4 We shall also
say in this case that W converges to M or that M is the limit of W . When W has
a limit structure M , the worlds of W must all agree with M on the atomic truths
and therefore also with each other. Since any given world in W can be enlarged so
as to encompass any given individual of M , it follows that the domain of M is the
union of the domains of the worlds in W . So the limit structure M is completely
determined by the collection of structures W providing the potentialist account of
it. Clearly, a given structure might have many different potentialist accounts.
Without referring directly to any limit structure, we say that a collection W of
L-structures is coherent, if the structures in W agree on atomic truth and every
4Although we have in mind the case of first-order structures and a first-order language, if
one is considering structures in a higher-order logic or an infinitary logic allowing formulas with
infinitely many free variables, one will want to accommodate larger collections of individuals. For
example, in Lω1,ω1 logic, one would want every world in a potentialist account to accommodate
any countably many individuals in a larger world; and in a higher-order logic, one may want full
directedness, so that any two worlds from W have a common accessible extension in W .
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structure in W can be extended in W so as to accommodate any individual arising
in any of the other structures. This is equivalent, of course, to saying that W
converges to a limit structure M , which is simply the union of the structures of W .
For example, in the case of potential infinity, a coherent collection of L-structures
can be regarded as a collection of finite approximations of some potentially infinite
limit structure. More generally, a coherent collection of structures can be regard as
an approximation of some incompletable limit structure in terms of its completable
parts.
For any assertion ψ in the underlying language L, consider the potentialist trans-
lation ψ✸, which will be the assertion in the language L✸ arising when one replaces
every instance of ∃x with ∃x and every instance of ∀x with ∀x. It is through
this translation, in light of theorem 1, that the potentialist can refer to truth in
the limit structure, without having that structure explicitly as a part of his or her
ontology [Lin13].
Theorem 1. If W provides a potentialist account of a structure M , then truth in
M is equivalent to potentialist truth at the worlds of W. Namely, for any L-formula
ψ and any a0, . . . , an ∈M , we have:
M |= ψ(a0, . . . , an) ⇐⇒ W |=W ψ
✸(a0, . . . , an),
for any W ∈ W in which the individuals a0, . . . , an exist.
Proof. This is proved by a simple induction on formulas ψ in the language of L.
The claim is immediate for atomic assertions, since every W ∈ W is a submodel
of M , and the case of Boolean connectives is also easy. For quantifiers, the point
is that asserting ∃x from the perspective of M is exactly asserting ∃x from the
perspective of W in the potentialist semantics, because the witness x might not
yet exist in W , but if it does exist in M then it will exist in some U extending W
by the definition of what it means for W to provide a potentialist account of M .
Similarly, asserting ∀x in M amounts to ∀x in W with respect to the potentialist
semantics. 
Let us now discuss what it means for a modal assertion ϕ(p0, . . . , pn) to be
valid with respect to a potentialist system W . In a general case, this concept ap-
plies to assertions ϕ(p0, . . . , pn) in the language L
✸(p0, p1, . . . ), which expands L
✸
with propositional variables p0, p1, . . . , treated syntactically as atomic formulas. A
central case for us, however, will be the validities ϕ(p0, . . . , pn) that are express-
ible in the more restricted language of propositional modal logic, using only the
propositional variables, logical connectives and modal operators (but no quanti-
fiers, relations or terms). For example, we shall consider the well-known modal
theories S4, S4.2, S4.3 and S5, which are expressed in propositional modal logic.
A modal assertion ϕ(p0, . . . , pn) is valid at a world W in W for a certain class of
assertions, if all the resulting substitution instances ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn), where assertion
ψi from the allowed class is substituted for the propositional variable pi, are true
at W . For example, we shall consider cases where a modal assertion ϕ(p0, . . . , pn)
is valid for sentences in the underlying language L, or in the potentialist language
L✸, or in these languages with parameters allowed from W . Let us denote by
ValW(W,L) the set of modal propositional validities at W in W with respect to
assertions from the language L, not allowing extra parameters from W ; and we
shall write ValW(W,LW ) for the corresponding set of validities with respect to L-
assertions, where now parameters from W are allowed. Clearly, it is a more severe
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requirement generally for a modal formula to be valid with respect to a larger
collection of assertions, and so:
L ⊆ L′ =⇒ ValW(W,L
′) ⊆ ValW(W,L)
In particular, allowing parameters results in possibly fewer validities:
Val(W,LW ) ⊆ Val(W,L).
We say that a propositional modal assertion ϕ is valid in W for substitution in-
stances from L if it is valid at every world of W . Let ValW(L) be the resulting set
of validities. It can happen that the worlds ofW do not all exhibit the same validi-
ties, and in this case, some individual worlds will exhibit more validities than the
system does as a whole. For example, in set-theoretic rank potentialism (see §3.2),
the modal assertions valid at all worlds are precisely those in S4.3, but individual
worlds can validate S5, which goes beyond S4.3.
In the potentialist semantics, it is natural to consider the converse Barcan for-
mula scheme ∀x p→ ∀x p, having substitution instances
∀xψ(x)→ ∀x ψ(x).
The following theorem lays out some easy potentialist validities, depending in some
cases on the nature of W .
Theorem 2. Suppose that W is any potentialist system of structures in a common
language L.
(1) The modal theory S4 is valid at every world of W.
(2) The converse Barcan formula is valid at every world of W.
(3) If the accessibility relation of W is directed, then the modal theory S4.2 is
valid at every world of W.
(4) If the accessibility relation of W is linearly ordered, then the modal theory
S4.3 is valid at every world of W.
In each case, the validities hold for all assertions in L✸, with parameters.
Proof. This is a standard elementary exercise in Kripke semantics, and so we
leave most of the details to the reader. Statement 1 holds because the poten-
tialist accessibility relation is reflexive and transitive; statement 2 holds because
the domains of the worlds increase monotonically with the accessibility relation;
statement 3 holds because the directedness of the accessibility relation leads im-
mediately to the validity of the .2 axiom p → p; and statement 4 holds
because linearity of the accessibility relation causes the validity of the .3 axiom
( p ∧ q)→ [(p ∧ q) ∨ (q ∧ p)]. 
We should like to emphasize that theorem 2 concerns only lower bounds on
the modal validities of a potentialist system, and it is possible in general for a
potentialist system W to exhibit more validities than would be indicated by this
theorem, as we shall discuss at length for various systems later in this article.
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2. Some tools for studying modal validities
So let us now turn to the harder question of upper bounds on the modal validities;
we should like to identify useful criteria for establishing that the valid principles
of potentialism for a given potentialist system W are contained in a certain modal
theory. Using these criteria, we shall be able to determine in many cases the exact
collection of modal validities for a given potentialist account. Our analysis will
make use of the tools developed in [HLL15; HL08; HL13] for the case of the modal
logic of forcing; the forcing modality was introduced in [Ham03]. One of the impor-
tant insights of that earlier work was that the existence of certain kinds of control
statements, which are easy to work with and recognize—switches, buttons, dials
and ratchets—enable one to place definite upper bounds on the modal validities of
a world.
To begin with an easy case, following [HL08], we say that an assertion s is a
switch in a Kripke model W , if both s and ¬s are true at every world. A
little more generally, s is a switch at a particular world W , if s and ¬s hold in
all the worlds one can reach from W . Thus, a switch is an assertion that can be
successively turned on and off as much as one likes, by accessing new worlds in the
Kripke model. A family of switches 〈s0, s1, . . .〉 is independent, if one can always
flip the truth values of any finitely many of the switches so as to realize any desired
finite pattern of truth. If a world W has independent switches, then they remain
independent in any accessed world.
Theorem 3. If W is Kripke model and world W admits arbitrarily large finite
collections of independent switches, then the propositional modal assertions valid at
W are contained in the modal theory S5.
In particular, if the switches work throughout W , as they do in many of our appli-
cations, then the validities of every world of W are contained within S5.
Proof. This argument follows the main idea of [HLL15, theorem 10], using the
labeling idea of [HLL15, lemma 9] and going back to the methods of [HL08, theo-
rem 6]. Those results were stated specifically for the case of forcing and models of
set theory, but the point here is that the same idea works generally in any Kripke
model. So we refer the reader to that presentation, but let us also briefly explain
the details. Suppose that W is a Kripke model which admits arbitrarily large finite
collections of independent switches at world W . Let us consider W as the initial
world of W and assume without loss that every world of W can be reached from
W by successive applications of the accessibility relation. If ϕ(p0, . . . , pn) is any
propositional modal assertion not in S5, then it is known to fail at a world w in
some finite propositional Kripke model M whose accessibility relation is the com-
plete binary relation (all worlds access all worlds). By duplicating some worlds
of M , if necessary, we may assume that the number of worlds is a power of two:
〈wj | j < 2m〉. Let 〈sk | k < m〉 be an independent family of m switches forW . We
shall simulate a copy of M inside W as follows. For each j < 2m, let s¯j be the
Boolean combination of the switches sk that accords with the same pattern as the
binary bits of the number j. We associate each world wj in M with the worlds W
in W for which s¯j holds. We may assume that world W in W is associated with
world w in M . Since the switch patterns s¯j are mutually exclusive and exhaustive,
this association amounts to a partition of the worlds of W , with one piece of the
partition associated with each world wj in M . For each propositional variable p
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appearing in ϕ, let ψp =
∨
{ s¯j | (M,wj) |= p }. Thus, ψp is true in a world U ∈ W
just in case p is true in the world u ofM with which U is associated. One may now
prove by induction on formulas φ in propositional modal logic that
U |=W φ(ψp0 , . . . , ψpn) ⇐⇒ (M,u) |= φ(p0, . . . , pn),
whenever u is associated with U , or in other words, whenever the pattern of switches
s¯j is true in W , where w = wj . Since ϕ fails at a world of M , we have therefore
found a failing substitution instance of ϕ in W . 
For a related formulation, let us say that a (possibly infinite) list of statements
d0, d1, d2, . . . is a dial in a Kripke model W , if every world in W satisfies exactly
one of the statements di and furthermore, every world can access another world
with any prescribed dial value. So you can adjust the dial as you like. If a world
satisfies di, then we shall say that the dial value is i in that world. The following
argument shows how to translate between dials and independent switches. Notice
that from any larger dial or from an infinite dial, we can construct smaller dials of
any given size, simply by keeping any desired fewer finite number of dial statements
and adding the statement that none of them holds.
Theorem 4. A Kripke model W admits arbitrarily large finite families of indepen-
dent switches if and only if it admits arbitrarily large finite dials.
Proof. If 〈si | i < m〉 is an independent family of switches, then for each j < 2m,
let dj be the assertion that the switch pattern of the si conforms exactly with
the binary digits of j. Since every world exhibits some unique pattern for the
switches, these form a mutually exclusive partition of truth; and since the switches
are independent, any world can access another world realizing any given dial value
dj . Conversely, if 〈dj | j < n〉 is a dial with 2m ≤ n, then let si assert that one of
the dj ’s holds, where the i
th bit of j is 1. These are independent switches, precisely
because any desired dial value is possible. 
Let us discuss a few more types of control statements. Following [HL08], a button
in any Kripke modelW is a statement b such that b is true at every world. The
button is pushed at a world if b holds at that world, and otherwise unpushed. A
pure button is a button b for which b→ b is true at every world, so that pushing the
button is the same as making it become true. In S4, if b is an unpushed button, then
b is an unpushed pure button. A family of buttons and switches is independent
in a Kripke model W , if there is a world at which the buttons are unpushed, and
every world W accesses a world U in which any additional button may be pushed,
without pushing any other as-yet unpushed buttons from the family, while also
setting any finitely many of the switches so as to have any desired pattern in U .
And similarly with dials.
Theorem 5. If W is a Kripke model that admits arbitrarily large finite families
of independent buttons and switches, or independent buttons independent of a dial,
then the propositional modal validities of W are contained in S4.2. The validities
of any particular world in which the buttons are not yet pushed are contained in
S4.2, and in any case, are contained in S5.
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Proof. This argument follows [HLL15, theorem 13], which extended the main tech-
nique of [HL08]. That earlier result was stated only in the case of models of set
theory, but the idea works generally in any Kripke model. Let us briefly describe
the details. If ϕ(p0, . . . , pk) is any propositional modal assertion not in S4.2, then
by [HL08, theorem 11] it fails at some world in a Kripke model M whose frame is
a finite pre-Boolean algebra. (A pre-Boolean algebra is a partial pre-order (B,≤)
whose quotient order B/ ≡ is a Boolean algebra, where a ≡ b⇐⇒ a ≤ b ≤ a is the
induced equivalence relation; we shall subsequently refer to the equivalence classes
as the ‘clusters’ of the Kripke model.) We may assume without loss by duplicating
worlds that the clusters of M have uniform size m, and let n be the number of
atomic clusters, that is, the number of atoms in the quotient Boolean algebra. We
may therefore index the worlds of M as waj , where j < m and a ⊆ n, where w
a
j
accesses wbi just in case a ⊆ b. Fix an independent family of n buttons 〈bi | i < n〉
and a dial 〈dj | k < m〉 of length m (use the switches to construct a dial if nec-
essary). For each world waj , let Φwaj = (
∧
i∈a bi) ∧ (
∧
i/∈a ¬bi) ∧ dj , which asserts
that the pushed buttons are exactly those indexed in a and the dial value is j. The
independence of the buttons and the dial ensures that these assertions are mutually
exclusive and a partition of truth, and furthermore that the worlds of W in which
Φwa
j
holds can access worlds with Φwbi just in case a ⊆ b. We associate each world
waj of M with the worlds W ∈ W in which Φwaj is true. For each propositional
variable p in ϕ, let ψp =
∨
{Φwaj | (M,w
a
j ) |= p }, which will be true in a world W
of W just in case W is associated with a world w in M in which p is true. One can
now verify that
W |=W φ(ψp0 , . . . , ψpn) ⇐⇒ (M,w) |= φ(p0, . . . , pn),
whenever world w in M is associated with world W in W . This is because it is
true for the propositional variables and is easily preserved by logical connectives,
and furthermore because the accessibility relation ofM is exactly simulated via the
association as we described. Since the original modal assertion ϕ(p0, . . . , pn) fails
at a world of M , we have therefore provided a substitution instance of ϕ that fails
at the associated worlds W of W , and so ϕ is not valid in W .
Finally, since the independent switches remain operable even after all the but-
tons are pushed, each individual world of W has its validities contained in S5 by
theorem 3. 
Following [HLL15], a ratchet for a Kripke model W at a world W is a sequence
of assertions r1, r2, . . . , rn, such that each ri is an unpushed button in W , each
statement ri necessarily implies all the previous statements rj for j < i and over
any world in which ri is not yet true, it can become true in some accessible world
in which ri+1 is not true; in this case, we say that the ratchet volume is i in that
accessed world. The idea of the ratchet, of course, is that it is unidirectional: the
ratchet volume can only go up, never down. It is sometimes convenient to append
a tautologically true statement r0 at the beginning and say that the ratchet volume
is 0 in the initial worldW . A ratchet is mutually independent with an independent
family of switches, if in every world, one can achieve any finite pattern for the
switches in an accessed world, without increasing the ratchet volume; and similarly
with a dial.
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Theorem 6. If W is Kripke model having arbitrarily large finite ratchets mutu-
ally independent with arbitrarily large families of independent switches (or with an
arbitrarily large finite dial), then the propositional modal validities of W are con-
tained in S4.3. The validities of any particular world with ratchet volume zero are
contained in S4.3 and, in any case, the validities of each world are contained in S5.
Proof. This argument builds on [HLL15, theorems 11], although again those results
were stated only for models of set theory, whereas the same idea works with respect
to any Kripke model. Let us briefly sketch the argument. If a modal assertion
ϕ(p0, . . . , pn) is not in S4.3, then since the finite linear pre-orders are a complete
set of frames for S4.3, it follows that ϕ fails at an initial world in a finite Kripke
model whose frame is a finite linear pre-order (a finite chain of clusters of worlds,
with each world in a cluster accessing all worlds in that cluster and any world in any
higher cluster). Let n + 1 be the number of clusters, and we may assume without
loss that each cluster has uniform size m. So the worlds of M can be described
as wij , where i ≤ n and j < m. Let r0, r1, . . . , rn be a ratchet in W of length n,
mutually independent with a dial 〈dj | j < m〉 (use switches to construct a dial if
necessary). For each world wij in M , let Φwij = ri ∧ dj be the assertion expressing
that the ratchet volume is i and the dial value is j, and we associate world wij with
the words W in W satisfying Φwij . The assumptions on the ratchet and dial ensure
that a world in W satisfying Φwij can access those worlds in W that satisfy some
Φwi′
j′
, exactly for i ≤ i′. Thus, the Φw assertions partition the worlds of W in a
way that exactly mimics the accessibility relation of M . For every propositional
variable p appearing in ϕ, let ψp =
∨
{Φw | (M,w) |= p }, which holds exactly in
the worlds of W that are associated with a world of M in which p is true. It now
follows by induction on formulas that
W |=W φ(ψp0 , . . . , ψpn) ⇐⇒ (M,w) |= φ(p0, . . . , pn),
whenever W is a world in W associated with world w in M . Since ϕ fails at an
initial world of M , this therefore provides a substitution instance of ϕ that fails
at any world of W with zero ratchet volume. So the validities of W are contained
amongst S4.3.
Meanwhile, because the switches remain operable even after the ratchet is used
up, every individual world ofW has its validities contained in S5 by theorem 3. 
For the set-theoretic structures that we have in mind for our application, it
often happens that one can define much longer transfinite ratchets, and these can
eliminate the need for switches. So let us describe how that works. Suppose that
W is a potentialist system forming a coherent collection of transitive set models
of some weak set theory, whose limit model is U . Assume furthermore that the
ordinals of U have limit ordinal height at least ω2 and that the models are able to
carry out simple ordinal arithmetic. Generalizing the terminology of [HLL15], let
us say that W admits a long ratchet starting at world W , if there are a sequence
of statements rα for α ∈ Ord
U , each an unpushed button in W , such that each
rα necessarily implies all earlier rβ for β < α, no world satisfies all the rα and in
any world in which rα is not yet true (perhaps because α does not yet exist in that
world), then there is an accessible world in which α exists and rα is true, but rα+1
is not true (perhaps because α + 1 does not yet exist). The ratchet is uniform if
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there is a formula η such that rα = η(α), expressed with parameter α. It is not
expected necessarily that the worlds of W each have all the ordinals α of the limit
model.
The main observation, originally made by George Leibman, is that a uniform long
ratchet can be used as in [HLL15, theorem 12] to provide an arbitrarily large finite
ratchet mutually independent with as many finitely many independent switches as
desired or with a dial. Basically, ordinals of the form ω · k+ j are viewed as having
simulated ratchet volume k and dial value j mod m, or switch values given by the
binary digits of j. Thus, one can view the assertion rω·k+j as expressing simulated
volume k and dial value j mod m, and the point is that you can change the dial
value to any desired number below m, without increasing the simulated ratchet
volume, simply by increasing rα while staying in the same ω-block of ordinals. For
ordinals above ω2, one views them as λ + j for some limit ordinal λ, and then
takes rλ+j as asserting the top ratchet volume with dial value j mod m. Thus, a
uniform long ratchet provides arbitrarily long finite ratchets mutually independent
with arbitrarily large dials or switches. Note that although the long ratchet rα itself
uses the ordinals α as parameters, the ratchet volume in any world is a definable
ordinal (or Ord itself in that world) and we may therefore definably extract the
corresponding finite ratchet and dial values without need for any parameter. We
therefore may deduce:
Theorem 7. IfW is potentialist system of transitive models of set theory admitting
a uniform long ratchet, then at the worlds ofW where the ratchet has not yet started
to crank, the modal validities are contained within the modal theory S4.3, and the
validities of any particular world of W is contained within S5.
In the previous several theorems, where we provided upper bounds on the propo-
sitional modal validities of a given Kripke model, we should like to point out that
the failing substitution instances we constructed were of the form ϕ(ψp0 , . . . , ψpn),
where the sentences ψp were various Boolean combinations of the switch, button
and ratchet assertions appearing in the hypotheses of the theorems. In particular,
in the case that the Kripke model W is a collection of L-structures under the po-
tentialist semantics and the control statements are L-sentences, then the arguments
show that we achieve the upper bound modal theories S4.3, S4.2 with respect to
L-substitutions. These arguments therefore provide a slightly stronger result than
achieving the upper bounds with respect to L✸-substitutions, since otherwise the
possibility might remain that there could be additional validities that work with
respect to L-substitutions, even if the stated bound is optimal for L✸-substitutions.
This observation is relevant for the applications in the next section to the case of
set-theoretic potentialism, where in most cases we are able to construct the relevant
control statements in the language L rather than only in L✸. Nevertheless, in a
few cases in §3 we will need the extra power of L✸ in order to achieve the desired
control statements.
3. Set-theoretic potentialism
3.1. Introduction. Let us now turn specifically to set-theoretic potentialism, our
motivating focus. We shall introduce and consider several natural kinds of set-
theoretic potentialism, and for each of them, we shall use the results of the previous
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section in order to identify exactly what are the modal validities of that variety
of potentialism, and under what circumstances a particular world might exhibit
a stronger collection of validities. We are particularly interested in identifying
instances of the potentialist maximality principle, which occurs when S5 is valid at
a world.
It may be useful to clarify the dialectic of the article. We are analyzing various
kinds of set-theoretic potentialism, but for most of the work we do so only as far
as they are simulated from the perspective of ZFC set theory, which we shall use
as our background theory. This choice of background theory is reasonable in light
of its familiarity and because it is acceptable to actualists and potentialists alike.
After all, since ZFC is a non-modal theory, it doesn’t take a stand on whether its
universe V should be regarded as fully completed or as incompletable and merely
potential. The former option is suggested when the language of ZFC is taken at
face value, while the latter is permissible when we adopt the modal translation of
the language of ZFC described in theorem 1.
For each of the kinds of set-theoretic potentialism we shall consider, it turns out
that the collection of modal validities can depend on a great variety of contextual
choices: on the particular world that is considered, on the language that is used,
on the modal vocabulary that is allowed, and on the parameters that are allowed.
For example, it is possible that a worldW validates S5 with respect to substitution
instances by sentences in the language of set theory, but only S4.3 when parameters
or modal vocabulary are allowed. For this reason, it becomes somewhat fussy or
technical to provide a full account of the situation; but we have nevertheless strived
to do so.
The most restrictive language we consider is the language of set theory L∈, which
beyond the logical vocabulary has only the set-membership relation ∈; the most
generous language is generally L✸∈,W , which also allows the modal operators and
arbitrary parameters from the world W being considered. Since as we mentioned
earlier, it is a more severe requirement for a propositional modal assertion to be
valid with respect to substitution instances from a more expressive language, it
follows in general that we have the following inclusions for any world W in any
potentialist system.
Val(W,L⋄∈,W )
Val(W,L✸∈)
Val(W,L∈,W )
Val(W,L∈)
⊆
⊆
⊆
⊆
As a preview, the following table briefly summarizes our main conclusions for the
main kinds of set-theoretic potentialism that we consider. Details and additional
cases can be found in the rest of the section.
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Rank-potentialism
V = {Vβ | β ∈ Ord }
ϕ = true in some larger Vβ
height potentialist, width actualist
S4.3 ⊆ ValV(Vβ,L
✸
∈,Vβ
) ⊆ ValV(Vβ,L∈) ⊆ S5
Grothendieck-Zermelo potentialism
Z = {Vκ | κ inaccessible }
ϕ = true in some larger inaccessible Vκ
height potentialist, width actualist
S4.3 ⊆ ValZ(Vκ,L
✸
∈,Vκ
) ⊆ ValZ(Vκ,L∈) ⊆ S5
Transitive-set potentialism
T = {W |W transitive }
ϕ = true in some larger transitive set
height potentialist, width potentialist
S4.2 ⊆ ValT (W,L
✸
∈,W ) ⊆ ValT (W,L∈) ⊆ S5
Forcing potentialism
M = {V [G] | G is V -generic }
ϕ = true in some forcing extension
height actualist, width potentialist
S4.2 = ValM(W,L∈,W ) ⊆ ValM(W,L∈) ⊆ S5
Countable-transitive model potentialism
C = {M |M |= ZFC, countable, transitive }
ϕ = true in some larger countable transitive model of ZFC
height potentialist, width potentialist
S4.2 = ValC(W,L∈,W ) ⊆ ValC(W,L∈) ⊆ S5
Countable-model potentialism
W = {M |M |= ZFC, countable }
ϕ = true in some larger countable model of ZFC
height potentialist, width potentialist
S4.3 = ValW(W,L
⋄
∈,W ) = ValW (W,L∈,W ) ⊆ ValW (W,L∈) ⊆ S5
In each case, the indicated lower and upper bounds are realized in particular
worlds, usually in the strongest possible way that is consistent with the stated
inclusions, although in some cases, this is proved only under additional mild tech-
nical hypotheses. Indeed, some of the potentialist accounts are only undertaken
with additional set-theoretic assumptions going beyond ZFC. For example, the
Grothendieck-Zermelo account of potentialism is interesting mainly only under the
assumption that there are a proper class of inaccessible cardinals, and countable-
transitive-model potentialism is more robust under the assumption that every real
is an element of a countable transitive model of set theory, which can be thought
of as a mild large-cardinal assumption.
We shall now consider the various forms of potentialism in detail, and not only
the ones mentioned above but also further variations. Since the subsections are
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largely independent of one another, readers may choose to focus on the forms of
potentialism they happen to find most interesting.
3.2. Set-theoretic rank potentialism. Let us begin with a very natural case
of height potentialism combined with width actualism, namely, the case of set-
theoretic rank potentialism, constituted by the worlds
V = {Vβ | β ∈ Ord }.
These worlds Vβ are the rank-initial segments of the cumulative set-theoretic hierar-
chy, and the potentialist modality here is “true in some larger rank-initial segment
of the universe,” so that ϕ is true at some Vβ , if ϕ is true in some larger Vδ.
This system clearly provides a potentialist account of its limit, the full background
set-theoretic universe V .
Theorem 8. In set-theoretic rank potentialism V, every world Vβ obeys
S4.3 ⊆ ValV(Vβ ,L
✸
∈,Vβ ) ⊆ ValV(Vβ ,L∈) ⊆ S5.
In other words, S4.3 is valid in every world for these languages and the validities
of every world are contained within S5.
Proof. Since the rank-initial segments Vβ are linearly ordered, it follows by theo-
rem 2 that every assertion in S4.3 is valid for rank potentialism, with respect to
any language, verifying the first inclusion. The central inclusion ValV(Vβ ,L
✸
∈,Vβ
) ⊆
ValV(Vβ ,L∈) follows from the fact that it is a less severe requirement for a proposi-
tional modal assertion to be valid with respect to less expressive language. Finally,
to show the last inclusion ValV(Vβ ,L∈) ⊆ S5, it suffices by theorems 3 and 4 to
show that we have an infinite dial that works in all these worlds. For j < ω, let dj
be the assertion that the height of the ordinals is λ + j, where λ is a limit ordinal
or zero. So dj is true in Vβ if and only if β = λ + j for some limit ordinal λ or
zero. These statements are expressible in the language of set theory L∈ without
parameters or modal vocabulary. And they form a dial, because every ordinal β is
uniquely expressed as λ+ j for some limit ordinal λ or zero and some finite j < ω,
and from any Vβ we can extend to a larger Vλ+j so as to realize any desired j. 
Theorem 9. The lower bound of theorem 8 is sharp, for there are some worlds Vβ
in the rank-potentialist system V with
S4.3 = ValV(Vβ ,L
✸
∈,Vβ ) = ValV(Vβ ,L∈).
Proof. Let rk be the assertion that the ordinal ω · k exists. These statements are
expressible in the language of set theory without parameters, since rk is equivalent
in any Vβ to the assertion that there are at least k distinct limit ordinals. The
statements constitute a ratchet for the system of rank potentialism, since once the
ordinal ω · k exists in Vβ , then all smaller ω · r also exist; they continue to exist in
all larger Vδ; and if ω · k does not yet exist in Vβ , then we can extend Vβ to Vω·k+1,
where ω · k exists but ω · (k + 1) does not yet exist. For any fixed n < ω and any
i < n, let d∗i assert that the dial value dj of the previous theorem has i = j mod n.
That is, we use the dial values of the previous theorem modulo n. The point is
that we can realize any dial value for d∗i without raising the ratchet volume, since
we simply move to the next block of size n, and so we have independent ratchet
and dials of any desired size, and these are expressible in the language of set theory
without parameters or modal operators. It follows by theorem 6 that the validities
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of Vβ for the language of set theory are precisely S4.3, for sufficiently small β, as
desired. 
We could have alternatively proved theorem 9 by using a long ratchet and apply-
ing theorem 7. Indeed, the proof we gave amounts to using the method described
in theorem 7 with the ratchet rα =“α exists.”
Corollary 10. The modal logic of rank potentialism with respect to the language
of set theory—the propositional modal assertions valid in all worlds—is exactly
ValV(L∈) = S4.3. Furthermore, ValV(L
+
∈ ) = S4.3 for any language L
+
∈ extending
the language of set theory L∈ by parameters, relations or modal vocabulary.
Proof. Theorems 8 and 9 show that S4.3 is valid in all rank-potentialist worlds
Vβ , and there is some world realizing only the validities in S4.3. So it is precisely
S4.3 that is valid in all worlds, and consequently ValV(L∈) = S4.3. It follows by
theorem 2 that ValV(L
+
∈ ) = S4.3 for any extension of the language, since the Vβ
are linearly ordered. 
Let us turn now to the upper bound of theorem 8, which also is sharp. Indeed, it
is sharp in a way that we find interesting and attractive, for the worlds realizing the
upper bound fulfill what we call the potentialist maximality principle, an interesting
set-theoretic principle of its own.
Definition 11. Let us define that a world W in a potentialist system W fulfills
the potentialist maximality principle for a class of assertions, if the modal theory
S5 is valid at W for those assertions under the potentialist semantics.
Since S4 is valid in any potentialist system by theorem 2, the potentialist maxi-
mality principle amounts to the validity of axiom 5
ϕ→ ϕ,
which expresses a kind of maximality principle, since it asserts that whenever as-
sertion ϕ is potentially necessarily true, then it is already actually true. Under this
principle, the collection of potentially necessarily true statements that are actually
true is maximized.
An ordinal δ is Σ3-correct, if Vδ ≺Σ3 V , meaning that Vδ and V agree on the
truth of Σ3 formulas with parameters from Vδ. Any such ordinal δ is a i-fixed point
and a limit of such fixed points, and more. The usual proof of the Le´vy-Montague
reflection theorem shows that the class of all Σ3-correct cardinals, denoted C
(3), is
closed and unbounded in the ordinals.
Theorem 12. The following are equivalent for any ordinal δ:
(1) Vδ satisfies the rank-potentialism maximality principle for assertions in the
language of set theory with parameters from Vδ. That is,
ValV(Vδ,L∈,Vδ ) = S5.
(2) δ is Σ3-correct.
Proof. (2 → 1) Assume that δ is Σ3-correct. Since we already know that S4.3 is
valid at Vδ, it suffices to verify the validity of axiom 5. So suppose that Vδ |=
ϕ(~a) for some assertion ϕ in the language of set theory with parameters ~a ∈ Vδ,
using the rank-potentialist semantics. This means that there is some λ ≥ δ, such
that for all θ ≥ λ we have Vθ |= ϕ(~a). The assertion ∃λ∀θ ≥ λVθ |= ϕ(~a) has
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complexity Σ3(~a) in the language of set theory
5, and so this assertion must be true
in Vδ, thereby verifying this instance of S5. And so the potentialist maximality
principle is true at Vδ for assertions in the language of set theory with parameters
from Vδ.
(1→ 2) Conversely, assume that S5 is valid in Vδ for assertions in the language
of set theory with parameters in Vδ. This implies that δ is a i-fixed point, since
for any ordinal α it is possibly necessary that iα exists (one need only grow the
universe sufficiently tall), and therefore, for any α < δ we know that iα exists
already in Vδ, and so δ = iδ. This implies Vδ = Hδ and so Vδ ≺Σ1 V by the Le´vy
reflection theorem; so δ is Σ1-correct. A similar argument works more generally
to establish Σ3-correctness. Specifically, suppose that a Σ3 assertion holds in V ,
using some parameters ~a ∈ Vδ. Every Σ3 assertion is equivalent to an assertion of
the form ∃x∀β Vβ |= ψ(x,~a). Thus, Vδ |= ∃x∀β Vβ |= ψ(x,~a), since one need
only grow the universe sufficiently tall until the witness x is found. By S5, we may
conclude that Vδ |= ∃x∀β Vβ |= ψ(x,~a), showing that the Σ3 assertion holds in Vδ.
So δ is Σ3-correct, as desired. 
Corollary 13. The upper bound of theorem 8 is sharp, for there are worlds Vδ with
ValV(Vδ,L∈,Vδ ) = ValV(Vδ ,L∈) = S5.
Proof. Theorem 12 shows that this is true for any Σ3-correct cardinal δ, and there
is a proper-class club of such cardinals. 
The maximality principle for the full potentialist language L✸∈ , not just the
language L∈ of set theory, turns out to be strictly stronger. Indeed, the following
theorem shows that the full maximality principle at a world Vδ reveals that this
Vδ is in a sense a miniature replica of the full ambient universe V in which it sits,
having all the same truths about the objects in Vδ. A cardinal δ is correct, if it is
Σn-correct for every n, or in other words, if it realizes the scheme Vδ ≺ V . In light
of Tarski’s theorem on the non-definability of truth, this concept is not expressible
as a single assertion in the language of set theory, although it can be expressed as
a scheme of statements, the assertion that δ realizes a certain type.
Theorem 14. The following schemes are equivalent for any ordinal δ:
(1) Vδ satisfies the rank-potentialist maximality principle for assertions in the
potentialist language L✸∈,Vδ allowing parameters from Vδ. That is,
ValV(Vδ,L
✸
∈,Vδ
) = S5.
(2) δ is a correct cardinal.
Proof. (2 → 1) Assume that δ is correct, so that we have the scheme Vδ ≺ V ,
and suppose that ϕ(~a) is true at Vδ, where ϕ is an assertion in the potentialist
language L✸∈ and ~a ∈ Vδ. Thus, ∃λ∀θ ≥ λVθ |= ϕ(~a) is true in V . Since the
rank-potentialist modalities are expressible in the language of set theory, it follows
from the Vδ ≺ V scheme that Vδ |= ∃λ∀θ ≥ λVθ |= ϕ(~a). Note that since Vδ ≺ V ,
it follows that Vδ and V agree on whether some particular Vθ satisfies a given rank-
potentialist assertion. Since Vδ ≺ V , it follows that the witness λ < δ also works
5The first author has a summary blog post at [Ham14b], which some readers may find helpful,
concerning locally verifiable properties in set theory and the accompanying characterization of Σ2
and Π2 assertions.
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in V , and so Vδ |= ϕ(~a), verifying this instance of S5. So Vδ satisfies the desired
potentialist maximality principle.
(1→ 2) Conversely, suppose that S5 holds at Vδ for assertions in the potentialist
language L✸∈ with parameters in Vδ. We know from statement 1 that δ is Σ3
correct. Suppose that δ is Σn-correct, and that a Σn+1 assertion is true in V .
So V |= ∃xψ(x,~a), where ψ has complexity Πn. By theorem 1, the set-theoretic
assertion ψ(x,~a) is true in V if and only if ψ✸(x,~a) is true at any Vβ containing x
and ~a. Thus, Vδ |= ∃xψ✸(x,~a), since once one goes high enough, the witness
x from V will exists. By S5, therefore, there is x ∈ Vδ with Vδ |= ψ✸(x,~a), which
means that V |= ψ(x,~a), and so we have found the desired witness x inside Vδ. So
δ is Σn+1-correct, as desired. 
Although ZFC proves that there are numerous Σ3-correct cardinals δ and there-
fore numerous instances Vδ of the potentialist maximality principle for assertions in
the language of set theory with parameters, it is meanwhile not provable in ZFC, if
consistent, that there is a cardinal δ fulfilling the scheme Vδ ≺ V , and so we do not
necessarily have instances of the potentialist maximality principle in the full poten-
tialist language of set theory L✸∈ with parameters. Meanwhile, the Vδ ≺ V scheme
is equiconsistent with and indeed conservative over ZFC, for every modelM |= ZFC
has an elementary extension in which this scheme is realized. To see this, consider
the elementary diagram of M together with the scheme asserting Vδ ≺ V , in the
language with δ as a new constant symbol; every finite subtheory is satisfiable by
the reflection theorem applied in M , and so by compactness there is an elementary
extension of M with a correct cardinal (see also [Ham03, lemma 5.4]).
Note that each of the statements in theorem 14 is a full scheme of assertions in
the language of set theory. In particular, one cannot express the concept of “Σn-
correct for every n” by a single statement in the language of set theory; instead, one
makes a separate assertion for each n in the metatheory. Similarly, the assertion
that a modal assertion is valid for all L✸∈ assertions is not a single assertion in the
language of set theory, but one can assert all instances of it as a scheme. In order to
formalize theorem 14 in ZFC, therefore, we may view it as two theorem schemes, one
proving every instance of statement 2, assuming the theory expressed by statement
1, and one proving every instance of statement 1, assuming the theory expressed by
statement 2. This subtle formalization issue did not arise in theorem 12, because
the bounded complexity of the correctness assumption there and the fact that the
arbitrary set-theoretic assertions are evaluated there only in various set structures
Vβ meant we could formalize it all as a single assertion in ZFC.
We expect (and suggest as a good graduate-student project) that one can provide
a somewhat tighter analysis connecting the precise degree of correctness of δ and
the modal-operator complexity of the assertions allowed to be substituted in the
S5 axioms. For example, if δ is Σ4-correct, then S5 would be valid at world Vδ with
respect to substitution instances in the language L✸∈ having at most one modal
operator at the front. As the correctness of δ improves, one can accommodate
more complex modal assertions in the substitution instances, and theorem 14 is
simply the amalgamation of all these level-by-level results.
Corollary 15. It is relatively consistent with ZFC that the upper bound of theorem 8
is sharp in a stronger way, with a world Vδ having
ValV(Vδ,L
✸
∈,Vδ) = ValV(Vβ ,L∈) = S5.
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Proof. Theorem 14 shows that this is true exactly at the (fully) correct cardinals
δ. The existence of a correct cardinal is independent of but equiconsistent with
ZFC. 
3.3. Variations on set-theoretic rank potentialism. Some height-potentialists
may prefer a more restrictive class of universe fragments. For example, perhaps one
wants to consider Vβ only when β is itself a strong limit cardinal, or a Σn-correct
cardinal, or where Vβ exhibits some other feature, such as satisfying some definable
theory T . These situations are unified by the case where we have a proper class of
ordinals A ⊆ Ord and we consider the potentialist system
VA = {Vβ | β ∈ A }.
Theorem 16. If A ⊆ Ord is a definable proper class of ordinals in the set-theoretic
universe V , and the definition of A is absolute to Vβ for all β ∈ A, then every world
Vβ in the relativized rank-potentialist system VA obeys
S4.3 ⊆ ValV(Vβ ,L
✸
∈,Vβ ) ⊆ ValV(Vβ ,L∈) ⊆ S5.
If A is definable but not necessarily absolute, then nevertheless every world obeys
at least
S4.3 ⊆ ValV(Vβ ,L
✸
∈,Vβ ) ⊆ ValV(Vβ ,L
✸
∈) ⊆ S5.
Furthermore, the lower bounds in each case are realized.
Proof. Since the worlds Vβ in VA are linearly ordered, it follows that every asser-
tion of S4.3 will be valid for the potentialist semantics with respect to any of the
languages. To show that some worlds validate only S4.3, it suffices by theorem 7
to find uniform long ratchets. Consider first the case where the definition of A is
absolute to Vβ for every β ∈ A. For example, this would be true if A was the class
of strong limit cardinals, or the class of Σn-correct cadinals, or if A was the class
of β for which Vβ satisfied a certain specific c.e. theory T . For any ordinal α, let
rα be the assertion that there are at least α many ordinals in A. These statements
are expressible in the language of set theory and they form a long ratchet, since
once they are true in some Vβ , they remain true in all taller models Vδ, by the
absoluteness assumption on A; they are all false in the smallest model Vβ where
β is the least element of A; they have the necessary downward implications; and
for any α, we can let β be the (α + 1)st element of A and observe that Vβ thinks
that there are precisely α many elements of A (again using the absoluteness of A);
it follows that rα is true in Vβ but not rα+1. Because we have therefore produced
a uniform long ratchet, expressible in the language of set theory, it follows from
theorem 7 that the propositional modal validities of any sufficiently small world Vβ
of VA, that is, where the ratchets have not yet been cranked, will be exactly
S4.3 = ValVA(Vβ ,L
✸
∈,Vβ ) = ValVA(Vβ ,L∈),
realizing the lower bound in a strong way. Furthermore, theorem 7 also shows that
every world of VA will have its validities contained in S5, establishing the upper
bound.
Consider now the case where A is definable, but not necessarily absolute to
all these Vβ . In this case, the statements rα of the previous paragraph might
not be a ratchet, since perhaps some Vβ thinks wrongly that there are α many
elements of A, but a larger Vδ recognizes that many of those ordinals are not
actually in A. Nevertheless, we can fix this problem simply by making our ratchet
SET-THEORETIC POTENTIALISM 19
assertions in the potentialist modal language L✸∈ , rather than in the language of set
theory. Specifically, for our ratchet statements, we use instead the assertion r¯α that
asserts that there are α many ordinals ξ for which (ξ ∈ A)✸, using the potentialist
translation of the definition of A in V . By theorem 1, the assertion (ξ ∈ A)✸ in some
Vβ is equivalent to ξ ∈ A in V , and so r¯α is true in some Vβ just in case there are
at least α many elements of A below β. (This is a sneaky trick, and the cost is that
our analysis on the bounds will apply only for L✸-substitution instances; it could
be that additional validities hold when one considers only substitution instances in
the language of set theory L∈ alone.) These revised statements in effect are able
to refer via the potentialist translation to the actual class A, and they form a long
ratchet for the same reasons that rα did in the previous paragraph. Thus, in any
case, the modal validities of the smallest world of VA is exactly S4.3 for assertions
in the potentialist language, again realizing the lower bound, and every world has
its validities for that language contained in S5, establishing the upper bound. 
Let us turn now to the question of whether the upper bounds are realized, for
which we shall undertake a similar analysis as in the case of set-theoretic rank po-
tentialism. For any class A, a cardinal δ is Σ3(A)-correct, if 〈Vδ,∈, A ∩ Vδ〉 ≺Σ3
〈V,∈, A〉. The proofs of theorems 12 and 14 can be adapted to establish the follow-
ing.
Theorem 17. Suppose that A is a definable class of ordinals, which is absolute to
Vδ for any δ ∈ A. Then the following are equivalent for the potentialist semantics
of VA = {Vβ | β ∈ A }.
(1) Vδ satisfies the potentialist maximality principle for assertions in the lan-
guage of set theory with parameters in Vδ.
(2) δ is Σ3(A)-correct.
Theorem 18. Suppose that A is a definable class of ordinals. Then the following
are equivalent for the potentialist semantics of VA = {Vβ | β ∈ A }.
(1) Vδ satisfies the potentialist maximality principle for assertions in the po-
tentialist language of set theory L✸∈ with parameters in Vδ.
(2) δ is a correct cardinal.
Thus, the upper bounds of theorem 16 are sharp. Notice that we do not need
the predicate for A in theorem 18, since it is definable and we get the absoluteness
of A to Vδ from Σn-correctness, once n is large enough.
Let us briefly generalize the analysis to the case of an arbtitrary class A ⊆
Ord, not necessarily definable, in Go¨del-Bernays set theory GBC. Consider the
potentialist system WA = { 〈Vβ ,∈, A ∩ β〉 | β ∈ A } in the language of set theory
with a predicate for A, a language we denote by L∈(A).
Theorem 19. Every world W in WA obeys
S4.3 ⊆ Val(W,L✸∈(A)W ) ⊆ Val(W,L∈(A)) ⊆ S5.
The lower bound is sharp, in that there are some worlds W with
S4.3 = Val(W,L✸∈(A)W ) = Val(W,L∈(A)).
Proof. This is simply an adaptation of theorem 16. Since we have added A explicitly
to the structures, it is in effect absolute between these structures, and so we get
the stronger conclusions of that theorem, but only in the language in which A is a
predicate. 
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Some set-theorists may prefer to use the sets Hκ, the collection of sets of hered-
itary size less than κ, for a regular cardinal κ, in place of the rank-initial segments
Vβ , and the analysis in this case is basically the same.
Theorem 20. The previous theorems also hold if one uses the sets Hκ for regular
cardinals κ, in place of the rank-initial segments Vβ . In particular, the potentialist
account consisting of all Hκ, or of Hκ for regular cardinals from some definable
proper class A, is in each case precisely S4.3.
(1) S4.3 is valid for Hκ-potentialism in every world Hκ.
(2) Some worlds Hκ validate only S4.3.
(3) Every world Hκ has its validities contained within S5.
Proof. The proof is essentially identical to the proofs of theorems 8 and 9. Namely,
the S4.3 assertions are valid since the Hκ are linearly ordered. Conversely, one
can define ratchets for the Hκ by letting rα assert that there are α many regular
cardinals κ for which Hκ is allowed as a universe fragment, using the potentialist
translation as in the proof of theorem 16. So there are worlds Hκ in which only
S4.3 is valid, and meanwhile, every world has its validities within S5. 
Since Vδ = Hδ for any i-fixed point δ, which happens on a closed unbounded
class of cardinals, the differences between Vδ-potentialism andHδ-potentialism tend
to evaporate once one has the idea to restrict the class of δ.
3.4. Grothendieck universe potentialism. In current mathematical practice,
the potentialist perspective is well illustrated by the category-theoretic usage of
Grothendieck universes, or Grothendieck-Zermelo universes, as we shall call them.
These are the rank-initial segments of the cumulative hierarchy Vκ, for an inacces-
sible cardinal κ. Zermelo introduced and studied these universes in 1930 ([Zer30]),
proving that they are exactly the models of second-order set theory ZFC2, and
they have been studied by set theorists continuously since that time—they form
the beginnings of the intensely studied large cardinal hierarchy. For example, the
consistency strength of a single Mahlo cardinal is strictly stronger than ZFC with
a proper class of inaccessible cardinals. Grothendieck rediscovered these universes
in the 1960s, also considering the empty universe ∅ and Vω as instances, and used
them to serve as a suitable universe concept in category theory.
In the category-theoretic practice, mathematical claims are made relative to a
given universe, rather than to the entire set-theoretic universe, but one feels free
at any time to move to a larger universe. This practice therefore illustrates almost
perfectly the potentialist idea, and accords very well also with how Zermelo himself
perceived his universes. With the second-order system ZFC2 in mind, Zermelo
wrote:
What appears as an ‘ultrafinite non- or super-set’ in one model
is, in the succeeding model, a perfectly good, valid set with both
a cardinal number and an ordinal type, and is itself a foundation
stone for the construction of a new domain. [Zer30]
That is, what is a proper class from the point of view of one model of ZFC2 is merely
a set from the point of view of some extended model. Zermelo is thus explicitly
viewing these Vκ as set-theoretic worlds.
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So let us refer to Grothendieck-Zermelo (GZ) potentialism as concerned with the
potentialist system
Z = {Vκ | κ inaccessible }.
Meanwhile, the Grothendieck universe axiom is the assertion that every set is an
element of a Grothendieck-Zermelo universe, or equivalently, that the inaccessible
cardinals are unbounded in the ordinals.
Theorem 21. Assume the Grothendieck universe axiom holds. Then Grothendieck-
Zermelo potentialism provides a potentialist account of the set-theoretic universe V ,
and every Grothendieck-Zermelo universe W obeys
S4.3 ⊆ ValZ(W,L
✸
∈,W ) ⊆ ValZ(W,L∈) ⊆ S5.
The lower bound is sharp, in that some Grothendieck-Zermelo universes W obey
S4.3 = ValZ(W,L
✸
∈,W ) = ValZ(W,L∈).
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of theorem 16. Note that because the
class of inaccessible cardinals is absolute to Vκ, we obtain the stronger conclusions
of that theorem. 
Let us now turn to the sharpness of the upper bound, which is a statement
with large cardinal strength. A cardinal κ is Σn-reflecting, if it is inaccessible and
Σn-correct.
Theorem 22. For any inaccessible cardinal κ, the following are equivalent:
(1) The Grothendieck universe axiom holds and Vκ satisfies the GZ-potentialist
maximality principle for assertions in the language of set theory with pa-
rameters from Vκ. That is,
ValZ(Vκ,L∈,Vκ) = S5.
(2) κ is a Σ3-reflecting cardinal.
Proof. (2 → 1) Assume that κ is a Σ3-reflecting cardinal. So κ is inaccessible and
Vκ is a Grothendieck-Zermelo universe. Since Vκ ≺Σ3 V and V has an inaccessible
cardinal, it follows that Vκ must have an inaccessible cardinal. Similarly, for any
β < κ we know that V has an inaccessible cardinal above β, and so Vκ must
agree. So the inaccessible cardinals are unbounded in κ. Thus, Vκ satisfies the
Grothendieck universe axiom. This axiom is itself a Π3 assertion, and so it is true
in V . So the Grothendieck universe axiom holds. Now suppose that ϕ(~a) holds
at Vκ in the GZ-potentialist semantics, where ϕ is an assertion in the language of
set theory and ~a ∈ Vκ. Thus, there is some inaccessible cardinal λ such that for all
inaccessible cardinals θ ≥ λ we have Vθ |= ϕ. As before, this is a Σ3 assertion, and
so it is true in Vκ. So there is a λ < κ, such that every inaccessible cardinal θ ≥ λ
in Vκ has Vθ |= ϕ(~a). The assertion that λ has this property has complexity Π2,
and so this λ also works in V . Therefore, Vκ |= ϕ(~a), verifying this instance of the
maximality principle, as desired.
(1 → 2) Assume that the Grothendieck universe axiom holds and that the GZ-
potentialist maximality principle is true at GZ-univese Vκ. In particular, κ is an
inaccessible cardinal. So it is a i-fixed point and therefore Σ1-correct. If a Σ2
assertion is true in V , then this is witnessed in all large enough Vθ, including when
θ is inaccessible, and so by the maximality principle, it is witnessed in Vκ, so κ
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is Σ2-correct. Finally, suppose that some Σ3-assertion is true. All such state-
ments have the form ∃x∀y ψ(x, y,~a), where ψ has complexity Σ1. This implies
∃x∀y ψ(x, y,~a) at Vκ, since once λ is large enough, then x will exist in Vθ for
any larger θ. So by the maximality principle, we conclude that Vκ |= ∃x∀y ψ(x, y,~a),
verifying this instance of Σ3-correctness. Since κ is inaccessible, we have proved
that κ is Σ3-reflecting. 
A cardinal κ is reflecting, if it is inaccessible and correct, so that it realizes the
scheme Vκ ≺ V . In other words, it is Σn-reflecting for every natural number n. As
with the correct cardinals, this is not a first-order expressible concept, although it
can be expressed as a scheme.
Theorem 23. For any inaccessible cardinal κ, the following are equivalent:
(1) The Grothendieck universe axiom holds and Vκ satisfies the GZ-potentialist
maximality principle for assertions in the potentialist language L✸∈ with
parameters from Vκ. That is,
ValZ(Vκ,L
✸
∈,Vκ) = S5.
(2) κ is a reflecting cardinal.
Proof. Simply adapt the proof of theorem 14 in the same way that theorem 22
adapts the proof of theorem 12. 
3.5. Transitive-set potentialism. Consider next the potentialist account of V
arising from the class of all transitive sets
T = {W |W is transitive }.
Thus, ψ is true at a transitive set W if there is another transitive set U with
W ⊆ U and U |=T ψ. Let us call this transitive-set potentialism. Since transitive
sets can grow both in height and in width, this form of potentialism can be viewed
as a form both of height and width potentialism. But it does not exhibit potentiality
equally in height and width, since any transitive setW can ultimately be completed
with respect to width, by moving to the smallest Vβ containing it, and then no
additional subsets of sets in W will ever arise in T . Because of this, the transitive-
set potentialist account is somewhat milder with respect to width potentialism than
it is with respect to height potentialism: any set appearing in a universe fragment
will eventually get all its possible subsets, after which time it will not grow in width
any further, although the heights of the transitive sets never stabilize in this way,
since every transitive set is included in another transitive set with additional larger
ordinals. In this sense, worlds in transitive-set potentialism are width-completable
in a way that they are not height-completable.
Theorem 24. In transitive-set potentialism, every world W obeys
S4.2 ⊆ ValT (W,L
✸
∈,W ) ⊆ ValT (W,L∈) ⊆ S5.
The lower bound is sharp, in that some worlds W have
S4.2 = ValT (W,L
✸
∈,W ) = ValT (W,L∈).
Proof. Since the union of two transitive sets is transitive, it follows that the po-
tentialist system of all transitive sets is directed and therefore by theorem 2 every
assertion of S4.2 is valid. To achieve S5 as an upper bound, it suffices by theorems 3
and 4 to show that this system admits an infinite dial. For this, we can use the same
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dial dj as in theorem 8, namely, the assertion dj that the ordinals have the form
λ+ j where λ is either a limit ordinal or zero. This is expressible by a sentence in
the language of set theory, correctly interpreted inside any transitive set, and since
any transitive set can be extended to any desired larger ordinal height, it forms a
dial.
To show that the lower bound is sharp, it suffices by theorem 5 to find an
independent family of buttons, independent of this dial. For this, let 〈Bk | k ∈ ω〉
be an infinite list of distinct arithmetically definable infinite, co-infinite sets of
natural numbers. Let bk be the assertion, “Vω exists and also Bk exists.” Note
that this assertion is upward absolute for transitive sets, since if Vω and Bk exist in
some transitive set, then this will continue to be true in any larger transitive set. So
each bk is a button. Furthermore, these assertions form an independent family of
buttons, since ifM is any transitive set, thenM∪Vω∪{Bk} is the union of transitive
sets and hence also transitive, and we have added Bk without adding any other Bj
for j 6= k. Since these buttons and dial values can be controlled independently of
each other without interference, it follows by theorem 5 that the modal validities in
any world where infinitely many of the buttons are not yet pushed will be contained
within and hence equal to S4.2, as desired. 
The upper bound of theorem 24 also is sharp, in light of the following two
theorems.
Theorem 25. The following are equivalent in transitive-set potentialism.
(1) The potentialist maximality principle holds for world M for assertions in
the language of set theory with parameters from M . That is,
ValT (M,L∈,M ) = S5.
(2) M = Vδ for some Σ2-correct cardinal δ.
Proof. (2→ 1) ConsiderM = Vδ, where δ is Σ2-correct, and assume ϕ(~a) holds
in M . So there is a transitive set N such that in all larger transitive sets U ⊇ N ,
we have U |= ϕ(~a). This is a Σ2 assertion about ~a, and so it must already be true in
M . So there is transitive set N ∈ M such that, inside M , every transitive U ⊇ N
satisfies ϕ(~a). This is a Π1-property about ~a and this particular N , which therefore
holds in V . Since M itself is such a transitive set, we conclude M |= ϕ, as desired.
(1 → 2) Assume that the potentialist maximality principle holds in M for as-
sertions in the language of set theory with parameters from M . First, we claim
that M is correct about power sets. If a is any set in M , then we claim that
∃b∀u u ⊆ a ↔ u ∈ b. In other words, the existence of the power set of a is
possibly necessary. This is simply because once you move to a transitive set that
has the actual power set of a, then it necessarily is the power set of a in all larger
transitive sets. SoM thinks P (a) exists (that is, the power set relativized toM). If
M does not have the actual power set of a, then there is some u ⊆ a with u /∈M , in
which case M ∪{u} is a transitive set containing M , which does not think that the
power set of a exists, contrary to this being necessary overM . So M computes the
power sets correctly. A similar argument shows that M computes Vα correctly for
any ordinal α ∈ M , since the existence of Vα is possibly necessary, and M cannot
have a fake version of some Vα, since in that case it would have to be wrong about
some power sets. Also, for any set a it is possible necessary that a ∈ Vα for some
ordinal α, and so this is already true in M . Thus, M = Vδ for some ordinal δ.
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To see that δ must be Σ2-correct, suppose that a Σ2 assertion ϕ(~a) is true in V .
This is witnessed by the existence of some ordinal β for which Vβ |= ψ(~a) for some
assertion ψ. So it is possibly necessary that, “there is an ordinal β for which Vβ
exists and satisfies ψ(~a).” Thus, this must already be true in M , and so ϕ(~a) is
true already in M , as desired. So δ is Σ2-correct. 
Theorem 26. The following are equivalent in transitive-set potentialism.
(1) The potentialist maximality principle holds for world M for assertions in
the potentialist language L✸∈ with parameters from M . That is,
ValT (M,L
✸
∈,M ) = S5.
(2) M ≺ V . In other words, M = Vδ for a correct cardinal δ, realizing the
scheme Vδ ≺ V .
Proof. This is like the proof of theorem 14 combined with the ideas of theorem 25.
If the maximality principle holds for world M in the potentialist language, then
we know by theorem 25 that M = Vδ for a Σ2-correct cardinal δ. But since the
transitive sets form a potentialist account of V in the manner of theorem 1, we can
as in theorem 14 show that δ is Σn-correct for every n.
Conversely, assume that M = Vδ ≺ V and ϕ(~a) holds in M , where ϕ is a
L✸∈ assertion. So there is a transitive set N , such that in all larger transitive sets
U ⊇ N we have U |= ϕ(~a). Since the existence of a such a set N and the potentialist
semantics are expressible in the language of set theory, it follows from M ≺ V that
there is such a set already in M , and consequently M |= ϕ(~a), as desired. 
Just as with rank potentialism, one may not want to allow all transitive sets, but
only some, say, those that satisfy a given c.e. theory T . In this case, the collection
of modal validities can depend on the theory and on the set-theoretic background.
Theorem 27. Suppose that T is a (sufficient) c.e. theory and every set x in V is
an element of a transitive model of T . Then the collection of all such models
TT = {W |W is transitive and W |= T }
provides a potentialist account of V . Furthermore, every world W in this system
obeys
S4.2 ⊆ ValTT (W,L
✸
∈,W ) ⊆ ValTT (W,L∈) ⊆ S5.
Reaching toward the lower bound, there is a world W obeying
ValTT (W,L
✸
∈,W ) ⊆ ValTT (W,L∈) ⊆ S4.3.
Examples show that the modal validities true at every world of TT can be exactly
S4.2, exactly S4.3, or exactly some other intermediate modal theory, depending on
the theory T and on the set-theoretic background V .
Proof. The collection of models TT provides a potentialist account of V , since if
W ∈ TT , then 〈W,∈〉 is a substructure of 〈V,∈〉 and if x is any set in V , then by
the assumption on T we have a transitive model containing {W,x} as an element,
which must therefore have W ⊆ U . So the weak directedness property is fulfilled.
But actually, a similar argument shows that TT is fully directed: if W0,W1 ∈ TT ,
then the assumption on T ensures that there is U ∈ TT with {W0,W1} ∈ U , which
ensures W0,W1 ⊆ U , as desired. By theorem 2, therefore, S4.2 is valid at every
world for the potentialist account provided by TT , verifying statement 1.
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Meanwhile, observe that TT is well-founded with respect to ∈, and so for any
ordinal α, we may let rα be the assertion, “the ∈-relation on the transitive models
of T has rank at least α.” Our hypothesis in the theorem that T is sufficient is
meant to ensure that models of T are able to refer to T by means of its arithmetic
definition and are also able to calculate the rank of a well-founded relation (so even
some very weak set theories suffice). Since the rank can never go down as the
transitive sets get larger, it follows that each rα will necessarily imply all earlier
rβ for β < α. And if rα is not true in some transitive W |= T , then we may
simply extend W to a transitive set U |= T of rank α + 1, so that W ⊆ U and
U |= rα ∧ ¬rα+1. So this is a uniform long ratchet, and therefore by theorem 7
any world in which this ratchet has not yet begun will have its validities contained
within S4.3. And furthermore, the same theorem provides S5 as an upper bound
for all the worlds.
Let us now give some examples showing that various modal theories can arise,
depending on the theory and on the set-theoretic background. For the easiest case,
if we take the empty theory, then TT is the same as the class T of all transitive sets,
whose modal validities we have already established as S4.2 in theorem 24. Next,
assume V = L in the background theory, and consider the theory T consisting of
the assertion “V=L,” so that the transitive models of this theory are exactly the
models Lα appearing in the constructibility hierarchy. These are linearly ordered,
and so S4.3 is valid for this potentialist system, and the validities are contained
within S4.3 by the previous paragraph, yielding exactly S4.3 as the common modal
theory.
Finally, assume V = L in the background, and let’s describe a theory T for
which the corresponding potentialist system TT exhibits modal validities strictly
in between S4.2 and S4.3. Let ZFC∗ be a fixed finite fragment of ZFC, which can
prove the existence of the reals and which furthermore is invariant by Cohen-real
forcing and by random-real forcing. Let T be the theory asserting that either (i)
ZFC∗ + V = L; or (ii) ZFC∗ + V = L[c] for an L-generic Cohen real c, but there is
no transitive set model of ZFC∗; or (iii) ZFC∗ + V = L[r] for an L-generic random
real, but there is no transitive set model of ZFC∗. For example, since ZFC∗ is true
in L, it follows by the finiteness of ZFC∗ that it is true in some large Lγ , and by
condensation the least γ for which Lγ |= ZFC
∗ is countable. Thus, we can easily
construct Lγ-generic reals c or r and form the extensions Lγ [c] and Lγ [r]. By using
the least possible γ, these models will have no set models of ZFC∗, and so we can
see that both statements (ii) and (iii) are possible from some Lγ . Note that if one
goes to a higher model, however, then (ii) and (iii) become impossible, because of
the requirement that there is no transitive set model of ZFC∗. In particular, both
(ii) and (iii) are possible from the smallest Lγ satisfying ZFC
∗, but once you have
one of them, the other becomes impossible, since the forcing notions do not add
generic reals of the other type. So this is exactly a violation of axiom (.3) in Lγ , and
therefore the validities of this potentialist system are not S4.3. Meanwhile, we claim
that the validities exceed S4.2. To see this, note that because of the homogeneity
of Cohen forcing and random-real forcing, all the models of statement (ii) have the
same theory, and similarly for statement (iii). Thus, every transitive model of T
is either a model of statement (i), and these are all linearly ordered, or else is a
model of the theory of statement (ii) or of statement (iii). So it is impossible that
a model of T has three independent unpushed buttons. In particular, the assertion
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“p, q and r are not three independent unpushed buttons,” which is expressible in
propositional modal lgoic, is valid for the potentialist system determined by the
transitive models of T , but this assertion is not an S4.2 theorem, since some models
of S4.2 do have three independent unpushed buttons. So the modal validities of TT
for this theory are strictly intermediate between S4.2 and S4.3, as claimed. 
3.6. A remark on Solovay’s set-theoretic modalities. Before continuing, let
us briefly discuss the connection of set-theoretic potentialism with some related
set-theoretic modalities considered by Solovay. After proving his famous analysis
of provability logic, Solovay had considered the modalities of “true in all Vκ for
κ inaccessible” and also “true in all transitive sets” (see [Boo93, chapter 13] and
this was extended in unpublished work of Enayat and Togha). To be precise, the
intended Solovay modal semantics are that Vδ |= ϕ if and only if Vδ thinks that
ϕ is true in all Vκ for inaccessible κ < δ, or Vδ thinks that ϕ is true in all transitive
sets in Vδ, respectively.
The Solovay modalities are thus precisely the inverses of the Grothendieck-
Zermelo and transitive-set potentialist modalities that we considered earlier in this
article. One might more accurately describe them under the slogans “true in all
smaller Vκ for inaccessible cardinals κ” and “true in all smaller transitive sets.”
The downward-oriented focus is amplified with nested modalities such as ϕ.
This downward orientation of the Solovay modalities gives them a markedly non-
potentialist character. Truly potentialist modal assertions, after all, reach outside
of the current actual world to refer to objects that might potentially exist in a larger
world, but which do not yet exist in the current world. Solovay’s modalities are not
potentialist in this way, and it is not surprising that he achieves very different modal
validities than what we have found for the set-theoretic potentialist modalities in
this article. The validity of the Lo¨b axiom for Solovay’s modality, for example, is
connected with the fact that his accessibility relation is inversely well-founded.
A separate, but related issue is that because the Kripke model for the Solovay
modality has deflationary domains, one faces certain issues in the semantics of
mixed quantifier/modal assertions, with the basic conundrum being the correct
meaning for ϕ(a) when there are accessible worlds in which a does not exist
(see [Gar01]).
3.7. Forcing potentialism. Let us now consider the version of set-theoretic po-
tentialism that arises by considering the set-theoretic universe in the context of all
its forcing extensions. This idea is closely connected with the modal logic of forc-
ing, as in [HL08; HL13; HLL15]; the forcing modalities were introduced in [Ham03].
The modal logic of forcing is, at bottom, an instance of set-theoretic width poten-
tialism and height actualism. Namely, we consider a model of set theory M in
the context of all its forcing extensions M [G] and their further forcing extensions
M [G][H ], interpreting ϕ as “true in some forcing extension,” and ϕ as “true
in all forcing extensions.” Since the relation of ground model to forcing extension
coincides with the substructure relation amongst these models, it follows that the
modal logic of forcing coincides with the potentialist semantics on this collection of
models. Note that because the forcing modalities are expressible in the language of
set theory, the distinction between L∈ and L✸∈ evaporates for this case. The main
results of [HL08] establish:
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Theorem 28 (Hamkins, Lo¨we). In the collection of models arising as forcing exten-
sions of a fixed countable model of ZFC, considered under the potentialist semantics,
every world W obeys
S4.2 = Val(W,L∈,W ) ⊆ Val(W,L∈) ⊆ S5.
Depending on the original model, some worlds W can have
S4.2 = Val(W,L∈,W ) = Val(W,L∈).
Depending on the original model, other worlds have
Val(W,L∈) = S5 or even Val(W,L∈,R) = S5.
The modal validities include S4 because inclusion is transitive and reflexive,
and we get axiom .2 not because the collection of models is directed, which it
isn’t by the non-amalgamation results discussed in [Ham16; FHR15], but rather
because any particular pair of statements ψ and φ that are each separately forceably
necessary, can be jointly forced by the product forcing. The main result of [HL08]
shows that in any model of V = L and many others, the modal logic of forcing
is exactly Val(W,L∈) = S4.2, because there are independent families of buttons
and switches. In the general case, the same argument shows that every world W
has Val(W,L∈,W ) = S4.2, since there are always independent buttons and switches
expressible with parameters. The same observation provides S5 generally as an
upper bound, since one can express independent switches via the GCH pattern
without need for any parameters. The main result of [Ham03] shows that it is
equiconsistent with ZFC that S5 is valid with respect to sentences in the language
of set theory (no parameters), achieving Val(W,L∈) = S5; the same paper shows
that MP(R), the maximality principle allowing real parameters (that is, S5 with real
parameters), has a slightly stronger consistency strength, achieving Val(W,L∈,R) =
S5.
Let us now enlarge the context by moving to the generic multiverseM of a model
of set theoryM |= ZFC, which is the collection of models obtained by closing under
the process of forcing extensions and grounds. Because the generic multiverse of
a countable model exhibits non-amalgamation (see [Ham16; FHR15]), it therefore
does not generally converge to a limit model. Nevertheless, we may view M under
the potentialist semantics, and discover the modal validities of this perspective on
potentialism. Indeed, the generic multiverse of a model of set theory is a natural
instance of width potentialism plus height actualism, since the various models of
the generic multiverse all have the same ordinals, even though sets can gain new
subsets in a forcing extension. Since the modal operators are definable in the
language of set theory, once again there is no distinction between L∈ and L✸∈ . The
following theorem was observed independently by Jakob Piribauer in his master’s
thesis [Pir17] at the University of Amsterdam, undertaken with supervisor Benedikt
Lo¨we.
Theorem 29. In the potentialist system of the generic multiverse M of a fixed
countable model of ZFC set theory, every world W obeys
S4.2 = Val(W,L∈,W ) ⊆ Val(W,L∈) ⊆ S5.
The lower bound is sharp, for every world M has a ground model W ⊆M obeying
S4.2 = Val(W,L∈,W ) = Val(W,L∈).
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Depending on the original model, the upper bound also is sharp, for there can be
other worlds W with
Val(W,L∈) = S5 or even Val(W,L∈,R) = S5.
Proof. We’ve already mentioned that S4.2 is always valid for the potentialist se-
mantics of the generic multiverse, which is the same as the modal logic of forcing
for those models, and exactly S4.2 is realized for every model when parameters are
allowed. Meanwhile, we also know that some models of set theory can exhibit S5 as
their forcing validities, as before. In order to prove the theorem, therefore, what we
shall show is that every model of set theory contains a ground whose validities are
exactly S4.2, without parameters. For this, it will suffice to show that every model
of set theory M has a ground model W by set-forcing such that W has arbitrarily
large finite families of independent buttons and switches, expressible without pa-
rameters. In order to prove this fact, we shall rely on the recent breakthrough result
of Toshimichi Usuba [Usu17], establishing the strong downward-directed grounds
hypothesis DDG, which asserts that the ground models of the set-theoretic universe
V are downward set-directed: for any set-indexed family of grounds {Wi | i ∈ I } in
the uniform ground-model enumeration, there is a ground model W with W ⊆Wi
for all i ∈ I. It follows that for every model of set theory M and for every ordinal
γ in M , there is a ground model W ⊆ M such that VWγ is the same as the Vγ of
the mantle of M , the intersection of all the grounds of M . In other words, VWγ is
least amongst the Vγ ’s of the grounds of M . In particular, the cardinal and GCH
structure of VWγ on the cardinals up to, say, ℵω+ω is absolutely definable in every
model of the generic multiverse of M , since the mantle itself is definable in those
models and W agrees with the mantle in that realm.
We claim that this ground W has independent buttons and switches, and there-
fore its valid principles of forcing are exactly S4.2. For this, we cannot seem to use
the stationary-set buttons that Hamkins and Lo¨we described in [HLL15, section 4],
since those make reference to an absolutely definable partition using the L-order.
Nevertheless, we may modify the buttons identified by Jakob Rittberg, or alterna-
tively modify the buttons of Friedman, Fuchino and Sakai, but using in each case
the cardinals as defined in the mantle rather than L. Since as we mentioned the
mantle is forcing-invariant and therefore an absolutely definable class common to
all the models in the generic multiverse, the referent of such expressions as ℵMantle2 ,
for example, is invariant in this generic multiverse. For this reason, the buttons
and switches relativized to the mantle rather than L will have the absoluteness
properties that made them function as independent buttons and switches. Thus,
the modal logic of forcing over W is exactly Val(W,L∈) = S4.2, as desired. 
Let us consider next an instance of set-theoretic potentialism that we find to
exhibit both height potentialism and width potentialism in a natural way. Namely,
consider a model of set theory M in the context of its generic multiverse. It is a
consequence of Usuba’s theorem on the strong DDG that every model W in the
generic multiverse of M is a forcing extension of a ground of M , so it has the form
W = Wr[G], where Wr ⊆ M is the ground of M indexed by r in the ground-
model enumeration theorem, and where G ⊆ Q ∈ Wr is Wr-generic. Let M be the
collection of models of the form VWβ , where W = Wr[G] is such a kind of model
in the generic multiverse of M and where β is large enough so that r,Q, G ∈ VWβ .
Because of non-amalgamation,M is not generally converging to a limit model, but
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we may nevertheless consider M under the potentialist semantics. This is height
potentialism, since we may always make β larger and thereby gain new ordinal
heights; and it is width potentialism, because we can always force to add more
reals or additional generic subsets to the infinite sets that we current have. What
are the modal validities of this variety of set-theoretic potentialism? Let us call it
the system of generic-multivese rank potentialism over M .
Theorem 30. In the system of generic-multiverse rank potentialism over a fixed
countable model of ZFC, every world W obeys
S4.2 ⊆ Val(W,L✸∈,W ) ⊆ Val(W,L∈) ⊆ S5.
Depending on the original model, there can be a world W with
S4.2 = Val(W,L✸∈,W ) = Val(W,L∈).
Proof. Since the inclusion relation is both transitive and reflexive on M, it follows
that S4 is valid at every world, for any language interpreted in those worlds. For
the validity of .2, we cannot appeal to directedness, since as we noted earlier this
collection of models has non-amalgamation and therefore is not directed; neverthe-
less, .2 is valid as in the modal logic of forcing because of product forcing. Namely,
if ϕ(~a) holds at world VWβ , where W =Wr[G] and r,G,Q ∈ V
W
β , then it means
there is some larger V Uγ , with U = Us[H ] and forcing s,H,P ∈ V
U
γ , such that any
still larger V U
′
δ satisfies ϕ(~a). Thus, this situation is forced by some condition in
P over Us. So for any V
W ′
θ extending V
W
β , we can still force over W
′ with that
forcing and find a common extension VW
′′
λ satisfying ϕ(~a). So S4.2 is valid.
Meanwhile, it is easy to see that the validities of any particular world are con-
tained within S5, since one can use the GCH pattern as a family of independent
switches. One can always force over any given model so as to achieve any desired
finite pattern for the GCH at the cardinals ℵn.
Finally, consider the generic-multiverse rank-potentialist systemM arising from
a model of ZFC+V = L. We may use the same independent buttons and switches
of theorem 28, the point being that one doesn’t need the entire universe to verify
the status of the buttons and switches that were used there. So it is enough to have
V
L[G]
β for large enough β in order to operate the buttons and switches. 
We are unsure whether every instance of generic-multiverse rank potentialism
contains a world whose validities are exactly S4.2, since in our argument, we used
a model of V = L in order to find a model with independent buttons and switches.
It would also suffice if there was a particular world VWβ that was tall enough and
definable in all the other worlds in the system, so that we could form buttons and
switches by reference to that world. In the case of generic-multiverse potentialism,
we were able to use the mantle for this purpose, but in generic-multiverse rank
potentialism, we do not know that the mantle will necessarily work, since perhaps
some VWβ can be wrong about the mantle of W . Perhaps the mantle of W is
definable in VWβ using the language L
✸
∈? If so, then we will get that the potentialist
system includes a world whose validities are S4.2 with respect to L✸∈ -sentences.
One observation that may bear on this question is the fact that the generic-
multiverse rank-potentialist system M, consisting of the models VWβ , where W is
in the generic multiverse ofM , is identical to the forcing-extension rank-potentialist
system that arises as V
M[G]
β , where M is the mantle of M . This is true because the
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strong downward directedness hypothesis implies that for every ordinal β in M ,
there is a ground Wr ⊆ M such that the Vβ of Wr is the same as the Vβ of the
mantle M.
3.8. Countable transitive model potentialism. Let us now consider a very
natural and attractive case of set-theoretic potentialism, namely, the potentialist
system C consisting of the countable transitive models of ZFC set theory.
Theorem 31. In the potentialist system C consisting of the countable transitive
models of ZFC, every world W satisfies every S4 assertion, with respect to substi-
tution instances in any language interpreted at every world of C; furthermore, the
propositional modal validities of any particular world, with respect to substitution
instances in any language extending the language of set theory, are contained in S5.
Proof. The potentialist accessibility relation is inclusion, which is transitive and
reflexive. Thus, S4 is valid at every world, even with respect to expansions of the
language interpreted in every world of C. Meanwhile, if W is a world in C, then
W admits arbitrarily large independent families of switches, such as the assertions
expressing the GCH patterns on the ℵn’s. The truth of these assertions can be con-
trolled independently by forcing over any countable transitive model of set theory.
Thus, by theorem 3, the modal validities of W are contained within S5. 
The situation is much nicer and we can prove far more under a certain robust-
ness assumption, namely, that every real is an element of a countable transitive
model of ZFC. This assumption amounts to a very weak large cardinal hypothesis,
for if there is an inaccessible cardinal, or even merely a worldly cardinal, then a
simple Lo¨wenheim-Skolem argument shows that indeed every real is an element of
a countable transitive model of ZFC.
Theorem 32. Assume that every real is an element of a countable transitive model
of ZFC. Then the potentialist system C consisting of the countable transitive models
of ZFC provides a potentialist account of the collection Hω1 of hereditarily countable
sets. Furthermore, every world W obeys
S4.2 = ValC(W,L∈,W ) ⊆ ValC(W,L∈) ⊆ S5.
The lower bound is sharp, for some worlds W have
S4.2 = ValC(W,L∈,W ) = ValC(W,L∈).
The upper bound also is sharp, for some other worlds W have
Val(W,L+) = S5,
for any particular countable language L+ extending L∈.
Proof. Certainly every countable transitive set is a substructure of 〈Hω1 ,∈〉, and
every element of Hω1 can be coded by a real and therefore placed into a countable
transitive model of ZFC, under our assumption. It follows that C is directed (and
even σ-directed), and so C provides a potentialist account of Hω1 . Since this system
is directed, it follows that S4.2 is valid at every world, regardless of what other
structure is imposed or which language or parameters are used.
Let Lα be the smallest transitive model of ZFC. This world has independent
families of buttons and switches, using a modified version of those in the modal
logic of forcing. Namely, the button bn asserts that n
th piece of the L-least partition
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of ωLα1 is no longer stationary (note that Lα is definable as a class in any transitive
model of ZFC), and the switch sm asserts that the GCH holds at (the current) ℵm,
for m ≥ 1. These buttons and switches can be controlled independently by forcing,
although the buttons are indeed buttons with respect to the potentialist semantics.
In particular, moving to a taller model will push all the buttons, since Lα will
be realized as countable there. Since we have sufficient independent buttons and
switches, it follows by theorem 5 that the validities of this world, with respect to
substitution instances in the language of set theory, are exactly Val(Lα,L∈) = S4.2.
The same idea works in any model, if parameters are allowed, showing S4.2 =
Val(W,L∈,W ) for every world. Meanwhile, the GCH-pattern switches are operable
over any model of set theory, and so the validities of any particular world are
contained within S5.
The upper bound is provided by theorem 33. 
Since C provides a potentialist account of Hω1 , it follows from theorem 1 that in
the potentialist language L✸ we may at any world W ∈ C to refer to truth in Hω1 ,
including truth about what other kinds of worlds in C there may be and how they
are related.
Note also that many other worlds of C than the Shepherdson-Cohen model Lα
will also have validities limited to S4.2. For example, any worldW that is absolutely
definable in all larger worlds will also have independent buttons and switches, for
essentially the same reason. This includes many models with various large cardi-
nals, if any exist, such as the smallest transitive model Lγ [µ] realizing the smallest
possible ordinal as a measurable cardinal, and similarly with much stronger large
cardinal notions.
Let us now turn to the upper bound, by investigating the nature of the worlds
satisfying the potentialist maximality principle S5 for this version of potentialism.
The maximality principle occurs when S5 is valid at a world. We find these worlds
quite attractively to instantiate the maximize maxim, with respect both to height
and width potentialism. The idea is that if W satisfies the potentialist maximal-
ity principle, then any statement σ that could become necessarily true, either by
moving to a wider or to a taller universe, is already true.
Theorem 33. If every real is an element of a countable transitive model of ZFC,
then every world U ∈ C can be extended to a world W ∈ C satisfying the potentialist
maximality principle for assertions in any fixed countable language L+ extending
L✸∈ (interpreted in every model of C). That is,
ValC(W,L
+) = S5.
Proof. Assume that every real is an element of a countable transitive model of ZFC.
It follows as we noted earlier that any countably many worlds of C have a common
upper bound. Consider any particular world U ∈ C and any countable language L+
extending the language of set theory. In particular, the new language might have
constants for every element of U . Enumerate the assertions of L+ as σ0, σ1, and
so on. Let W0 = U be the initial world. Given Wn, ask whether Wn |= σn in
this potentialist system. If so, then there is some Wn+1 |= σn; otherwise, choose
Wn+1 extending Wn as you like. Having selected Wn for all n < ω, let W be any
world with Wn ⊆ W for all n. If W |= σn, then since Wn can access W , it
follows that Wn |= σn, in which case Wn+1 |= σn, and so W |= σn. Thus, W
satisfies every instance of axiom 5 in this language, and since it also satisfies S4.2,
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it follows that S5 is valid in W . And the same conclusion holds with respect to any
larger world than W , since S5 is persistent. 
We find it interesting to consider the previous theorem in the case that V = L.
In this situation L can have countable transitive models of some very rich theories,
such as a proper class of Woodin cardinals or supercompact cardinals or what have
you. So not everyW ∈ C will satisfy V = L, and some will believe themselves to be
very far from L. Nevertheless, because every such W is countable in L, we will be
able to extend W to some Lα, which of course satisfies V = L. In particular, this
shows that we can achieve the CTM-potentialist maximality principle in a world
satisfying V = L. This situation illustrates one of the central philosophical points
made by the first author in [Ham14a], namely, that the capacity to extend the
universe upwards tends to undermine the view of L as contradicting the ‘maximize’
maxim of Maddy.
In particular, if V = L and every real is an element of a countable transitive
model of ZFC, then there are such worlds W satisfying the potentialist maximality
principle for sentences in any countable language extending the language of set
theory (and including L✸∈ if desired), such that W |= V = L; and there are other
such worldsW satisfying the potentialist maximality principle for which W |= V 6=
L.
3.9. Countable model potentialism. Let us now enlarge the potentialist system
frommerely the transitive models to the collection consisting of all countable models
of ZFC set theory.
At first, let’s consider this as a potentialist-like system under the substructure
relation, so that one world
〈
W,∈W
〉
accesses another
〈
U,∈U
〉
just in case the first
is a substructure of the second, which means W ⊆ U and ∈W=∈U ↾ W . The
potentialist idea here is that one can move to a larger universe of set theory by
adding more objects, including new elements of old sets, as long as the new ∈-
relation agrees with the old one on the previously existing sets.
Theorem 34. Assume ZFC is consistent and consider the potentialist system con-
sisting of all countable models of ZFC, under the substructure relation. Every world
W in this potentialist system obeys
S4.3 = Val(W,L⋄∈,W ) = Val(W,L∈,W ) ⊆ Val(W,L∈) ⊆ S5.
If W is any countable nonstandard model of ZFC, then
Val(W,L✸∈) = Val(W,L∈) = S5.
Proof. The main theorem of [Ham13] shows that the countable models of ZFC
are linearly pre-ordered by embeddability: for any two models, one of them is
isomorphic to a substructure of the other, and furthermore, one model embeds
into another just in case the ordinals of the first order-embed into the ordinals of
the second. It follows that the nonstandard models of ZFC are universal under
embeddability.
Because the models are linearly pre-ordered by embeddability, it follows that S4.3
is valid in every world. Because these are ZFC models, the GCH-pattern statements
are independent switches, and so the validities of any world are contained in S5.
Meanwhile, for any world W , let a = ∅W , and let rn be the statement “a has at
least n distinct elements.” These statements are all false in W , of course, since a
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has no elements in W . But the particular embeddings constructed in [Ham13] and
variations of them show that there are larger models U into which W embeds, in
which as many new elements of a as desired are introduced. Thus, these statements
form a ratchet, and the GCH-pattern statements are a mutually independent family
of switches. So the modal validites of W for such statements are contained within
S4.3, and so the first chain of equations and inclusions is proved.
Finally, for the final statement of the theorem, it is a consequence of the fact
that the nonstandard models all access isomorphic copies of each other—the main
theorem of [Ham13] shows that they are all bi-embeddable—that S5 is valid in each
of them for sentences of L✸∈ . 
Note that a simple compactness argument shows that this potentialist system has
amalgamation and even σ-amalgamation, and furthermore has the joint embedding
property, and so actually there is a Fra¨ısse´ limit here, which will be a copy of the
countable random Q-graded digraph, as described in [Ham13]. Even though the
collection of countable ZFC models does not have a limit model in the sense of our
original definition, if we used this embedding-based approach to defining the limit
structure, we would be led to find a limit model in this countable random Q-graded
digraph. The substructures of this graph that are ZFC models form a potentialist
system containing isomorphic copies of any given countable model of ZFC, which
furthermore provide a potentialist account of this graph as the limit structure.
Some set theorists may object that it is more natural to use a slightly more
restricted accessiblity relation, because the substructure relation allows for some
rather strange things. For example, with the substructure accessibility relation,
every set is potentially finite, because results in [Ham13] show that every model is
isomorphic to a substructure of the hereditarily finite sets of any ω-nonstandard
model. Further, no sets are necessarily disjoint, since for any two sets a, b, we can
access a larger world that has an object that is an element of both. Similarly, the
empty set of one world can have members or even become infinite in another world.
All these things seem a little strange.
So it may be a little more orderly or stable to consider the collection of countable
models of ZFC under the transitive-substructure relation, rather than the full sub-
structure relation. That is, in this modified version, we say that one world
〈
W,∈W
〉
accesses another world
〈
U,∈U
〉
, just in case the first is a transitive substructure of
the second, meaning that W ⊆ U and ∈W=∈U↾ W and furthermore, x ∈U y ∈ W
implies x ∈ W . So the larger world agrees with the smaller world on the member-
ship relation of objects in the smaller world and furthermore, no new elements of
old sets are added.
Since this modified accessibility relation is reflexive and transitive, and refines the
substructure relation, this is indeed a potentialist system, which therefore validates
S4 at every world. And since these are models of set theory, the GCH-pattern
switches show that the validities of any particular world are contained within S5,
even when restricted to sentences in the language of set theory.
This modified system is not directed, nor even weakly directed, because if
〈
W,∈W
〉
is a countable ill-founded model of ZFC, then there is a countable ∈W -descending
sequence s and there can be no extension
〈
U,∈U
〉
containing s in which
〈
W,∈W
〉
is
transitive, even if W is an ω-model, since s reveals the ill-foundedness of W . Thus,
this system does not provide a potentialist account of any limit model.
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We believe that under some reasonable assumption, we can get that this poten-
tialist system has upper bounds for countable increasing chains in the transitive
substructure relation, as in the result of [Ham16]. That is, if you can move succes-
sively to larger and larger countable models of ZFC, with each model transitive in
the next one, then there is a model at the top inside of which they are all transitive
submodels. In this case, we can get models of S5 in this system, for sentences in
any countable language, by the same argument as in theorem 33. We shall leave
further investigation of this modified potentialist system for another project.
We suggest that it may be fruitful to consider the multiverse model of Git-
man and Hamkins [GH10] as a potentialist system under either of the accessibility
relations mentioned above. The collection of worlds are the countable computably-
saturated models of ZFC, and we may consider them either under the substructure
accessibility relation or the transitive-substructure accessibility relation.
Lastly, we should like to mention that in current work, the first author [Ham18]
has established that the modal logic of end-extensional potentialism for the models
of PA is precisely S4. Adapting that work to the case of set theory, he and W.
Hugh Woodin [HW17] similarly established that the modal logic of top-extensional
potentialism for the countable models of ZFC is also precisely S4.
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